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LIST OF PARTIES
The only parties or persons claiming an interest in this
litigation would be the plaintiff Gail Parsons Heyes, the
defendant John R. Ward, and the University of Utah through
its Medical Center.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the lower court err in granting Defendant's

Motion for Summary Judgment on the assumption that the record
did not show any disputed fact as to whether defendant John R.
Ward was acting as an individual physician rather than an
University of Utah employee or was estopped from claiming immunity?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action was originally commenced in April of 1984
by the plaintiff against the defendant claiming that from 1980
through December of 19 82, defendant, Dr. Ward, undertook the
responsibility for the medical care and treatment of the
plaintiff and that he was negligent in providing such care.
Shortly thereafter the defendant moved to dismiss the
Complaint on the basis that a legal action could not be maintained against him in his individual capacity in that the
defendant was allegedly acting within his scope of employment
at the University of Utah Medical Center.
After hearing arguments by both sides, the Honorable
Leonard H. Russon ordered that Defendant's motion be continued
without date and that Plaintiff's counsel would have the
right to take the deposition of the defendant on the limited
issue of whether his treatment of the plaintiff was undertaken
and performed within the scope of his employment by the University
of Utah.

Accordingly, the deposition of defendant was subse-

quently taken.
-2-

Defendnat then moved for Summary Judgment based upon the
affidavits, documents, and deposition contained in the record.
The lower court after hearing argument entered a Memorandum
Decision finding that the "care and treatment of the plaintiff
was in the capacity of an employee of the University Hospital
and was within the scope of such employment."

The Court, based

upon this conclusion, entered Summary Judgment in favor of the
defendant and against the plaintiff dismissing Plaintiff's
cause of action.

It is from this Order of Summary Judgment

that the present appeal is now taken by Plaintiff-Appellant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following Statement of Facts is based upon the affidavits of the plaintiff, the defendant, Dr. G.Richard Lee,
various billing documents contained in the record, and the
deposition of the defendant.
1.

Beginning in July of 1956 the defendnat John R. Ward

was employed as a professor and Division Head of Rheumatology
in the School of Medicine by the University of Utah (Lee
Affidavit).
2.

Since that time Defendant has been continuously

employed by the University of Utah in its Medical Center.

There

is no written contract between the University of Utah and the
defendant.

(Ward Depo., p. 15; Defendant's Answer to Plaintiff!s

First Set of Interrogatories No. 3) .
3.

The plaintiff in 1979 was referred by her physician,

Dr. Edward Heyes, to the defendant for the purpose of being
-3-

treated for rheumatoid arthritis.

Dr. Ward continued treating

the plaintiff for a period of approximately two years until
December of 1982.

During this period of time Plaintiff was

not informed that Dr. Ward was acting as an employee of the
University Hospital or was acting in any other capacity other
than as a private physician treating a private patient.
(Affidavit of Plaintiff, 1[3) .
4.

Plaintiff stated in her affidavit that she received

bills from Dr. Ward personally and made checks payable to him
personally.

Such checks were returned to her endorsed by what

Plaintiff believed to be Dr. Wardfs signature.

It was not

until the mid-1982 that bills began to request that she make
payment to the Division of Rheumatology.

A copy of the checks

and billing statements are attached to the Affidavit of the
plaintiff and to Defendant's Response to Request for Production
of Documents.
5.

Dr. Ward in his deposition stated that he is paid

every two weeks by the University of Utah.

He stated that he

had no outside source of income which is generated from the
care of patients outside of the University itself.

However,

he admitted that he contributed to a retirement plan for the
self-employed other than through the University.

(Ward Depo.,

p. 8) .
6.

Dr. Ward in his deposition stated that his salary is

based on a negotiated income through the department chairmen
and the Dean of the School of Medicine and that some of the funds
to pay his salary are generated through the "Physicians Billing
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Office" which is run by the Dean!s Office,

Ward stated that

guidelines are established by the Department which sets a
minimum, a base, and a maximum income for each University
professor.

Ward stated:

That by virtue of University policy, some of
us who started out at a very low salary and because
of inability to increase salary say by more than
three or six percent, and intervals where no increases
were possible, salary supplementation within these
guidelines comes from Physicians Billing Office and
is sent to us as a check. From this there are no
retirement benefits that are paid by the University.
(Ward Depo., pp. 9-10).
7.

Dr. Ward denied having actually signed the checks

which appeared to have his signature as an endorsement.

He

stated that the Physicians Billing Office is authorized to
sign his name on checks.
8.

(Ward Depo., p. 12).

Dr. Ward stated that his percentage of income generated

from paying patients varies considerably from year to year and
that in 19 84, for example, it would be about twenty-five percent.
(Ward Depo., p. 13).
9.

Dr. Ward stated that he could not recall talking with

the plaintiff concerning billing procedures and the cost involved
at any time during his treatment of her.

Only in cases other

than ordinary routine office visits does Dr. Ward inform his
patients of extra charges or other business-related transactions.
(Id.)
10.

This lawsuit was commenced in May of 1984.

Because

Plaintiff did not believe that Dr. Ward was affiliated with
the University of Utah,no notice of claim pursuant to §63-30-13,
U.C.A. was filed as to either Dr. Ward or the University of Utah.
-5-

11.

The lower court, in granting Defendant's Motion for

Summary Judgment, entered the following Memorandum Decision:
The defendant's Motion for Dismissal is granted.
The testimony under oath by way of affidavit of John R.
Ward and G. Richard Lee, as well as the deposition of
John R. Ward, indicate that Dr. Ward's care and
treatment of the plaintiff was in the capacity of an
employee of the University Hospital and was within
the scope of such employment. Plaintiff's Complaint
does not allege gross negligence, fraud or malice.
University Hospital is a state-owned institution and
by statute falls within the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act of 1965. 63-30-4 governs this matter. Defendant
will prepare the order.
12.

The lower court subsequently entered a "Summary

Judgment" in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff.
It is from this order that the present appeal is taken.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The lower court erred in granting Summary Judgment to
the defendant since a factual question exists as to whether
Defendant was acting as an individual physician at the time he
was treating the plaintiff or whether he was acting as a
governmental employee.

Further, a factual question exists

as to whether the defendant can rely upon the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act or whether his conduct and representations estop
him from claiming its benefit.
ARGUMENT
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IN THAT MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT EXIST
AS TO BOTH THE SCOPE OF DEFENDANT'S
EMPLOYMENT AND ESTOPPEL AGAINST DEFENDANT.
The creation of the Governmental Immunity Act by the

-6-

State Legislature has caused a reveral of traditional common
law principles of employer-employee relationships.

Under

common law, an employer is only liable for the actions of
its employee if that employee was acting within the scope of
his employment.

This principle of respondeat superior allowed

a plaintiff to sue both the employer and the employee and to
hold the former liable if the employee was within the "scope"
required.

The plaintiff in such a case would attempt to show

facts evidencing the employee's link to the employer's
business while, at the same time, the employer would attempt
to show that the employee was acting on a lark of his own.
In any event, the plaintiff in non-governmental cases can always
sue the employee even if the employer is not liable.
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act completely changes the
posture of these type of cases.

Section 63-30-4 provides

that no suit may be individually maintained against an
employee of a governmental agency if that employee was acting
within the scope of employment or under color or authority.
Only in cases where the employee acted or failed to act due to
fraud or malice may the employee be held individually liable.
Section 63-30-4, U.C.A.

In addition, the Governmental Immunity

Act provides a series of procedural steps which must occur if a
claim is to be made against the employing governmental entity
including a claim and notice for injury (63-30-11 and 63-30-12) ,
a time limitation for the filing of such notice (63-30-13) and
a time limitation as to the filing of an action after the claim
has been denied.

(63-30-15).
-7-

In these type of cases, therefore,

it is possible that a plaintiff will have no remedy against
either the employer or the employee if these procedural steps
have not been performed.
In the instant case the lower court held that the defendant
was acting within the scope of his employment at the University
of Utah and therefore was not individually liable to the plaintiff.
The effect of such decision under the circumstances of this case
is to deny the plaintiff any remedy against any entity since she
did not follow the necessary claim procedures when proceeding
against a governmental entity.

Thus, this is not an abstract

discussion as to whether an employee will be joined with an
employer as a defendant but is a question of whether a cause
of action of any type may be maintained against any defendant.
The lower court erred in concluding as a matter of law that
the defendant was protected by the Utah Government Immunity Act
and was acting as an employee of the University of Utah at the
time of treating the plaintiff.

It is, of course, fundamental

that doubts or uncertainties concerning issues of fact properly
presented, or the nature of inferences to be drawn from the
facts, are to be construed in a light favorable to the party
opposing the summary judgment motion.

Bowen v. Riverton City,

656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982); Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332
(Utah 1977).

In addition, in negligence cases, summary judgment

is appropriate in only the most clear instances.

Webster v.

Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983)- F.M.A, Acceptance Co. v.
Leatherby Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1332 fUtah 1979).
Plaintiff asserts that at all times material to this dispute
-8-

defendant John Ward treated her in the capacity of a private
physician.

Dr. Ward relies upon the fact that he was a University

employee during this period of time.

He argued in the court

below that any actions he took as to any patients necessarily
required the conclusion that he was acting within his scope of
employment at the University.

However, there are sufficient

facts in the record to require a different conclusion.

First,

the plaintiff was referred to Dr. Ward by her own physician and
was not referred to the Arthritis Department at the University
of Utah Medical Center.

Second, Plaintiff was never informed

by the defendant that he was acting as an employee of the
University and not as a private treating physician.

Third,

for a period of over a year and a half all of the statements
received by the plaintiff and the checks sent to Defendant
were solely in the name of Dr. John Ward and not to or from the
Division of Rheumatology.

Fourth, the income derived from

these type of patients varies from year to year and serves as
additional supplemental income to the minimum base pay paid by
the University of Utah.

In other words, the more patients a

University doctor sees the more income that physician earns each
year.

Finally, the defendant contributes to a Keogh Plan or

other retirement plan for the self-employed through the Physician
Billing Office and not through the University,
The lower court should have allowed the question as to
whether Dr. Ward was acting within the scope of his University
employment to go to a trier of fact.

It is basic law that the

question of "scope of employment" is a factual determination.
-9-

It can only be decided in light of the evidence and circumstances of each case,

Costa v. Able Distributors, Inc., 653

P.2d 101 (Hawaii App. 1982); Hansen v. Skate Ranch, Inc., 641
P.2d 517 (N.M. App. 1982); Morain v. Lollis, 371 P.2d 473 (Okla.
1962); Gossett v. Simonson, 411 P.2d 277 (Ore. 1966) and
Combined Insurance Co. of America v. Sinclair, 584 P.2d 1034
(Wyo. 1978) .
In Holve v. Draper, 505 P.2d 1265 (Ida. 1973) an automobile
accident occurred in which the plaintiff maintained that an
employee was liable for the employee's negligence because the
employee was acting within the scope of employment at the time
of the accident.

The lower court entered summary judgment on

behalf of the defendant and the plaintiff appealed.

The Idaho

Supreme Court reversed, stating the following:
[W]e have examined the record and we find
that the affidavits conflict on the material
factual issue of whether, at the time of the
accident, a master-servant relationship existed
between Draper and Swanson. A motion for summary
judgment must be denied where the affidavits
conflict respecting issues of material fact.
Id. at 1269.
The lower court relied upon the affidavits of the defendant
and G. Richard Lee in determining that Dr. Ward was acting within
the scope of his employment at the time of the treatment.

An

examination of both of these affidavits, however, shows that
they are merely conclusionary since they state that the activities
carried out by Dr. Ward in his treatment of the plaintiff was
within the scope of his employment.

Such an affidavit cannot be

considered in a motion for summary judgment since the conclusion

-10-

of scope of employment is the very issue before the court.
To raise a genuine issue of fact, an affidavit must do more
than reflect the affiant's opinions and conclusions.

Water v.

Rocky Mountain Recreation, 508 P.2d 538 (Utah L973) . Mere
conclusions of ultimate facts and law and general allegations
do not fulfill the requirements of affidavits filed with respect
to motions for summary judgment.

Pace v. Sagebrush Sales Co.,

560 P.2d 789 (Ariz. 1977).
The mere fact that a person is employed at the time of an
alleged incident does not per se mean that person is acting
within the scope of his employment.

There are numerous instances,

for example, of governmental employees who may or may not be
acting within the scope of their government employment.

A city

policeman who is hired as a security officer for a public
function may or may not be considered an employee of the city
during such time period.

Belcher v. Spengel, 429 U.S. 118 (1976);

Johnson v. Hackett, 284 F. Supp. 933 (D. Pa. 1968); Traver v.
Meshriy, 627 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1980).
Numerous state employees are now engaged in consultations
with private clients some of which consultations occur at the
physical facilities of the state and during the time period of
state duty hours.

University of Law professors, for example,

frequently consult with private clients and lawfirms at the
University Law School and during normal class hours.

In such

cases a factual question exists as to whether such professor
is supplementing his own income as an individual or is receiving
compensation as a professor by being allowed to retain additional
-11-

income from private practice.
For these reasons, therefore, the lower court erred in
concluding that as a matter of law the conclusionary statements
made by the defendant and by a University employee overcame the
factual disputes raised by Plaintiff in her affidavit and in
the other evidence contained in the record.

The lower court

should have properly submitted these factual questions and
their inferences to a trier of fact.
A second alternate ground of error also exists.

The

Utah Governmental Immunity Act is an affirmative defense raised
by the defendant.

Had this case gone to trial Plaintiff would

have claimed that she had been mislead by the actions of the
defendant and the University of Utah in believing that she was
being treated by a private physician and not by a state employee.
Plaintiff would have alleged an estoppel to assert the
mental Immunity defense.

Govern-

Clearly, the elements needed for

equitable estoppel are present in this case as is stated by
the affidavit of the plaintiff since she was never informed of
the true employment nature of defendant and relied upon this
act of silence to her detriment in that she will, in effect,
lose any cause of action against any defendant.

Leaver v. Grose,

610 P.2d 1262 (Utah 1980); Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor
Control Commission, 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979).
Further, estoppel has been held in the past by this Court
to be a legitimate defense to the application of the various
procedural requirements of the Utah Government Immunity Act.
Rice v. Granite School District, 456 P.2d 159 (Utah 1969);
-12-

Whitaker v. Salt Lake City Corp., 522 P.2d 1252 (Utah 1974).
Thus, in any event a factual issue exists as to whether
the defendant is now estopped from being able to claim the
benefits of the Governmental Immunity Act because of his
alleged failure to inform the plaintiff as to the true employment relationship.
CONCLUSION
The record as it now comes before this court creates a
factual question as to whether Dr. Ward was acting within the
scope of his employment to such an extent that he is personally
immune from suit by the plaintiff.

If a mere conclusionary

statement is all that is required by a state official or by a
state employee then the traditional rule that scope of employment is a factual dispute will be totally abolished.

Obviously,

what an employee or an employer believes to be a scope of
employment definition is only one factor for a trier of fact
to consider in examining the total circumstances of the relationship.

Here, for example, it is entirely possible that a trier

of fact would conclude that Dr. Ward was acting as a private
physician on his own behalf at the time he treated the plaintiff.
In any event, a substantial question of estoppel exists
as to whether the defendant can now claim the benefits of
the Governmental Immunity Act based upon his failure to inform
the plaintiff that he was merely an employee of the University
of Utah and that she should look to the University of Utah and
the State of Utah for any problems which arose during the doctor-
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patient relationship.

The conduct of the defendant and the

alleged reliance by the plaintiff are clearly questions of
fact which cannot be decided on summary judgment.
For the preceding reasons, therefore, the judgment of the
lower court must be reversed and the matter set for factual
determination.
Respectfully submitted,

s John H. McDonald
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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APPENDIX

MERLIN R. LYBBERT
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: 521-9000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

GAIL PARSONS HEYES,
Plaintiff,

MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.

Civil No. C84-2750

JOHN R. WARD,

Judge Leonard H. Russon

Defendant.

Defendant John R. Ward moves the Court for its Order dismissing plaintiff's Complaint upon the grounds and for the
reason that said defendant is, and was at all times mentioned
in the Complaint, an employee of the University of Utah and said
alleged acts occurred during the performance of his duties and
within the scope of his employment, and under the provisions of
Section 63-30-4, U.C.A., 1953 as amended, a legal action cannot
be maintained against him in his individual capacity.
This Motion is based in part upon the attached Affidavits
of defendant John R. Ward and G. Richard Lee, Dean, University
of Utah School of Medicine.
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Dated this

day of June, 1984.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & IvIARTINEAU

~/
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M e r l i n R. L y b b e r t
Attorneys for Defendant

<JU',\

I

MERLIN R. LYBBERT - A2029
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: 521-9000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

GAIL PARSONS HEYES,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN R. WARD

vs.

Civil No. C84-2750

JOHN R. WARD,

Judge Leonard H. Russon
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
)
)

ss.

JOHN R. WARD, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

That he is the defendant named in the above-entitled

action.
2.

That at all times mentioned in plaintiff1s Complaint

he was an employee of the University of Utah School of Medicine,
with the rank of Professor and Head of the Division of Rheuatology.
3.

That at all times mentioned in plaintiff's Complaint

the treatment and care rendered to plaintiff was done in his
capacity as an employee of the University of Utah and during
the performance of his duties and within the scope of his em-

-1-

ployment, as aforesaid.

_2i
John R. Ward, M.D.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me t h i s J?f

day of May,

19 84.
^

Notary Public
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah
My Commission Expires

-2-

MERLIN R. LYBBERT - A2 02 9
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: 521-9000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

GAIL PARSONS HEYES,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF
G. RICHARD LEE

vs.
Civil No. C84-2750
JOHN R. WARD,
Judge Leonard H. Russon
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
)
)

ss.

G. RICHARD LEE, upon being first duly sworn, deposes
and says:
1.

That since the 1st day of March, 1978, he has been

the Dean of the University of Utah School of Medicine, with
the rank of Professor, and as such is familiar with the status
and terms of employment of physicians at the University.
2.

Beginning on the 1st day of July, 1956, John R. Ward,

M.D., was employed as a Professor and Division Head of Rheumatology in the School of Medicine by the University of Utah.
3.

That in connection with the services of Dr. John A.

-1-

Ward at the University of Utah, whether rendered in his capacity
as a teacher of medical principles and procedures or in connection with the care and treatment of patients, such activities are
carried out as a part of his duties as an employee of the University of Utah School of Medicine and within the scope of his employment.
4,

That his treatment and care of Gail Parsons Heyes commenc-

ing in September, 1980 through December 8, 1982, were undertaken
and rendered in his capacity as an employee of the University of
Utah Hospital and within the scope of that employment.

G. R^bchard Lee, JM.D.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

/2-~ day of June,

1984.

s-jaajlt 0

flux*)

Notary Public
Residing at
y/^ (jtA&JU

My Commission Expires:

/^//K
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&-JL / Utah

JOHN H. MCDONALD

Attorney for Plaintiff
965 East 4800 South, Suite 3J
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: 268-0877
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GAIL PARSONS HEYES,

)
) .

Plaintiff,

)

JOHN R. WARD

)

STATE OF UTAH

PARSONS HEYES

)

vs.

Defendant.

AFFIDAVIT OF GAIL

Civil No. C-84-2750

)

)
ss.

County of Salt Lake)
COMES NOW the Gail Parsons Heyes, the affiant, and
after being duly sworn upon oath deposes and says:
1.

That she is the Plaintiff in the above styled

2.

That in 1979 she was referred by her physician, Dr.

action.

Edward Heyes, to Dr. John Ward the Defendant herein to be treated
for rheumatoid arthritis.
3.

That at the commencement of this physician/patient

relationship the financial arrangements were made whereby she
was to pay Dr. John Ward personally for his service and that at
no time was she informed that Dr. Ward was acting as an employee
of the University Hospital or was acting in any other capacity

other than his capacity as a private physician treating a private
patient.
4.

In furtherance of this relationship as a private

physician treating a private patient, Plaintiff received bills
from Dr. Ward personally and made checks payable to him personally,
said checks being endorsed with what Plaintiff believed to be
Dr. Ward's signature and copies of some of those checks are
attached hereto and made a part of this affidavit by reference.
It was not until mid 1982 that bills began to request that she
make payment to the Division of Rheumatology.
The affiant say not further.
DATED this 11th day of October, 1984.

GAIJXPARSONS HEYES
GAIJ

•

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 11th day of
October, 1984.
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in Salt Lake City, Utah
My Commission Expires:
9/13/87
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Gail Parsons Heyes, to Merlin
R. Lybbert, Attorney for Defendant, 10 Exchance Place, Eleventh
Floor, P.O. Box 3000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110, this 11th day
of October, 1984.
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MERLIN R. LYBBERT - A2029
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: 5 21-9000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

GAIL PARSONS HEYES,
Plaintiff,
vs.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

JOHN R. WARD,

Civil No. C84-2750
Defendant.

Judge Leonard H. Russon

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss having been considered under
the provisions of Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
having come on regularly for hearing before the above named
Court on the 15th day of October, 19 84, the Honorable Leonard
H. Russon, Judge presiding, and plaintiff having been represented by John H. McDonald, and defendant being represented by
Merlin R. Lybbert, and the Court having heard oral argument of
counsel and having considered the Affidavits, deposition, Interrogatories, Answers to Interrogatories and Request for Production
of Documents, and the Court being fully advised in the premises,
now, therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That defendant be granted Summary
Judgment against the plaintiff, No Cause of Action, each party

-1-

u

to bear his own costs,
Dated this

day of €k=Hkaber, 1984.
BY THE COURT:

onard H. Russon
District Judge.

APPROVED AS TO FORM THIS
^(p

day of Oetote*, 1&&4.

John H. McDonald
Attorney for Plaintiff

-2-

